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I. INTRODUCTION
The Florida Legislature withdrew from extensive restructuring of the
statutes governing juvenile delinquency during the 1998 session, making
only modest changes to the new chapter, chapter 985, which it introduced in
1997. In the child welfare area, however, the legislature did make more
substantial changes, at least in part, in response to the passage of new federal
legislation governing abuse and neglect matters.
In the appellate courts, there was substantial activity, albeit generally
technical in nature. There were, however, several significant opinions by the
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center, Fort
Lauderdale, FL.; Colgate University, 1967; Boston College Law School J.D., 1970. The author
thanks Tracey McPharlin for assistance in the preparation of this article. This article covers
cases decided through June 30, 1998.
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Supreme Court of Florida, although they too were of a technical nature. The
appellate courts continue their periodic commentary expressing concern with
the failure of the trial courts to comply with rudimentary statutory
obligations.
II. DEPENDENCY
A. Adjudicatory Issues
Admission of out of court statements by child victims in dependency
proceedings is an important probative part of such cases. There is a growing
body of statutory and case law, nationwide, which deals specifically with out
of court statements by youngsters and the development of special hearsay
exceptions.' In Florida, section 90.803(23) of the Florida Statutes governs
hearsay exceptions for the statement of the child/victim.2 In Department of
Health & Rehabilitative Services v. M.B.,3 the Supreme Court of Florida had
before it an appeal raising the question of whether a child/victim's prior
unsworn statement, which was inconsistent with the child's in court
testimony, was admissible where the testimony supported a determination
that the earlier unsworn statement met sufficient safeguards of
reliability.4 The statute in question provides that the court must find that
there are sufficient safeguards of reliability in the child's statement and shall
take into account the child's mental and physical age and maturity, nature
and duration of the abuse or offense, the relationship of the child to the
offender, reliability of the assertion, reliability of the child/victim, and any
other factors deemed appropriate.5 The court found that section 90.803(23)
of the Florida Statutes permits a child/victim's prior inconsistent statements
to be admitted as substantive evidence if found to be trustworthy. 6 The court
held that the child's out of court statements could be admitted into evidence,
without the necessity that they be consistent with the child's trial testimony,
so long as strict standards of reliability are applied before admitting the
statements.7 In addition, the court held that the applicable evidentiary
standard in such a case is a preponderance of the evidence, or greater weight
1. See generally MICHAEL J. DALE Er AL, REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT, 7.06
(Matthew Bender 1998).
2. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23) (Supp. 1998).
3. 701 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 1997).
4. Id. at 1156.
5. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23) (Supp. 1998).
6. M.B., 701 So. 2d at 1162.
7. id.
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of the evidence, since the proceeding is that of a civil dependency matter
nature.8
Under Florida law, a parent who voluntarily executes a written
surrender of the child, and consents to the entry of order giving custody of
the child to the state or an agency, for purposes of adoption, may only
withdraw the consent, after acceptance of the child by the Department or
licensed child care agency, upon a finding that the surrender and consent
were obtained by fraud or duress.9 In Bailey v. Department of Health &
Rehabilitative Services,10 the issue raised was whether a parent could
withdraw consent to a dependency petition.1" In a split opinion, the appeals
court held that absent a showing of fraud or duress, the consent could not be
withdrawn in a dependency proceeding.12 In dissent, Judge Sharp argued
first that the lower court order contained none of the findings as to the
voluntariness and full understanding of the consent required in a termination
13 14
case. Second, he argued that Interest of LB.J., which held that it was not
necessary to show fraud or duress in order to withdraw valid consent in a
dependency proceeding, was still valid.15  Instead, he relied upon Rule
8.315(b) of the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, which provides that at
any time prior to the beginning of a disposition hearing the court may permit
an admission of the allegations of the petition to be withdrawn and, if an
adjudication has been entered, it may be set aside. 16 Thus, in Judge Sharp's
view, the court had discretion to set aside the consent.17
In 1991, in Padget v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services,8
the Supreme Court of Florida held that parental rights may be terminated if
the court finds that the child is at substantial risk of imminent abuse or
neglect by the parent, and this finding is based on proof of neglect or abuse
of other children if the evidence shows a substantial risk that the child will
suffer similar abuse.19 In 1998, in Eddy v. Department of Children & Family
8. Id. at 1163.
9. FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(d)2 (Supp. 1998).
10. 703 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
11. Id. at 1225.
12. Id.
13. Id. (Sharp, J., dissenting).
14. 497 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
15. Bailey, 703 So. 2d at 1226 (Sharp, J., dissenting).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991).
19. Id. at 566. See also, Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1991 Survey of Florida Juvenile
Law, 16 NOvAL. REv. 333,368-373 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 Survey]; Michael I Dale, Juvenile
Law: 1996 Survey of Florida Law, 21 NOVA L. REv. 189, 216-17 (1996) [hereinafter 1996
Survey].
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Services, an unmarried father was charged with dependency on the basis of
a ten year old criminal adjudication for sexual abuse of nephews when he
was between thirteen and sixteen years of age. The Fifth District Court of
Appeal held that prior sexual abuse of other children is insufficient alone to
establish a substantial risk of imminent abuse; there must be independent
22evidence showing that sexual abuse is likely to recur. For example,
independent evidence in the form of "testimony from a mental health
specialist that the parent or custodian suffers from an untreatable problem
would provide the nexus between the prior abuse and the allegation of
prospective abuse. '23 Here, there was no nexus, and the court reversed the
adjudication of dependency.
In S.J. v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services,25 a mother
petitioned for certiorari review of two post-dependency decisions
challenging, inter alia, an amended order in which the court applied a best
interests of the child standard in the determination to remove a child
previously adjudicated dependent from the mother's home and to place the
26child with an adult relative. The appellate court reversed, finding that the
circuit court had applied an erroneous standard in removing the child from
the mother's care and custody and placing the child in long term relative
placement, without adherence to the statutory requirements. The statutory
authorization for post-disposition placement is found in section
39.508(9)(a)8.b. of the Florida Statutes.28 The appellate court held that
there is no authority to deviate from the statutory requirement, which states
29that the test is endangerment of the safety and well being of the child.
There is no statutory provision for independent judicial consideration of the
best interests of the child.30 The Department had the burden to show that the
20. 704 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
21. Id. at 735.
22. Id. at 736.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. 700 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
26. Id. at 72.
27. Id. at 73.
28. FLA. STAT. § 39.508(9)(a)8.b. (Supp. 1998). The relevant section states:
In cases where the issue before the court is whether a child should be reunited
with a parent, the court shall determine whether the parent has substantially
complied with the terms of the case plan to the extent that the safety, well-
being, and physical, mental, and emotional health of the child is not
endangered by the return of the child to the home.
Id.
29. S.J., 700 So. 2d at 75.
30. Id.
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child's safety was endangered by remaining in her mother's home.3 1 The
court concluded that while the best interests of the child is an overriding
concern in all chapter 39 proceedings, there is no legislative authorization
for using a best interests of the child legal standard to determine a change in
placement of a dependent child.32
As prior survey articles in this law review have discussed, the appellate
courts have regularly admonished the trial courts in both dependency and
delinquency cases for repeated failures to comply clear mandatory statutes.
33
A particularly egregious example of the appellate courts' reluctant but clear
exposition of concern is Ritter v. Department of Children & Family
Services.34 Ritter involved a writ of mandamus to compel the trial court to
issue a ruling in a case in which it had delayed almost twenty-seven months
between the day of the dependency hearing, and the rendering of the order
declaring the children dependent. The appellate court advanced that the
reason for the delay was not explained in the record.36 The court then stated,
"[w]e find this case falls within that class of cases in which trial courts have
been sternly admonished for unnecessarily impeding the prompt
administration of justice, especially in matters involving child custody."37
The court added, that it found that the delay of nearly twenty-seven months
in the case, coupled with the proceeding for mandamus brought by one of the
parties, "casts sufficient doubt upon the wisdom and fairness of the decisions
rendered by the trial judge to require that all of the orders in this matter be
vacated and that a new evidentiary hearing be conducted forthwith."3  The
court then suggested that the case be assigned to another judge.39 Judge
Harris concurred, adding that there should be a bright line standard beyond
which a delayed judgment simply would not be recognized. 40
An important issue in the area of dependency is what happens to
children who have been adjudicated dependent and placed into state care
when they reach the age of eighteen. This issue was raised in L.Y. v.
Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services.41 Specifically, the issue in
L.Y. was whether the court could dismiss a dependency case and terminate
31. Id.
32. Id. at 74.
33. See Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1994 Survey of Florida Law, 19 NovA L. REv.
139, 140 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 Survey].
34. 700 So. 2d 804,805 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
35. Id. at 804-05.
36. Id. at 805.
37. Id. (citations omitted).
38. Id.
39. Ritter, 700 So. 2d at 805.
40. Id. at 806 (Harris J., concurring).
41. 696 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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juvenile court jurisdiction over a child when she reached eighteen, although
she continued to receive services from the Department. The appellate court
affirmed, without prejudice to the appellant's right to seek appointment of a
guardian pursuant to chapter 744 of the Florida Statutes if there was a
showing of incapacity. 3 The court explained that the issue was a legislative
one and not a judicial one. 44 As the court put it:
Unfortunately for L. Y, the fight is in the wrong arena as the
legislature has not provided for judicial review of these services
still being rendered to a now 18 year old, previously determined to
be dependent, when that individual may not be incapacitated. The
conscientious, concerned trial court properly held that the laws of
Florida currently do not permit retention of continuing juvenile
jurisdiction and review until the individual is 21.45
B. Guardian Ad Litem Issues
Because Florida is a participant in the Federal Child Abuse Prevention
and Treatment Act of 1974 ("CAPTA"), the state is obligated to provide a
guardian ad litem for a child in dependency proceedings. The operation of
this program is governed by statutes, court rules, unpublished supreme court
orders, and case law. 7 In cursory opinions devoid of statutory analysis, the
Florida courts have rejected claims that the failure to have a guardian ad
litem in place in the proceeding has been a fundamental error, on a number
of occasions over the past few years. 48 In W.R. v. Department of Children &
Family Services,49 the Fourth District Court of Appeals continued this trend,
and reaffirmed the proposition that the absence of an active guardian ad
litem does not preclude a trial court from adjudicating children dependent.50
42. Id. at 431.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. (commenting that the California Legislature has authorized such jurisdictions
under the California Welfare and Institution Code, § 303. CAL. WELFARE & INST. § 303
(1998)).
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 5105 (1998).
47. See generally 1996 Survey, supra, note 19, at 222.
48. Id.
49. 701 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
50. Id. at 652. Ironically, the trial court held that it could not conclude that the grounds for
the termination of parental rights were established by clear and convincing evidence because the
absence of an active guardian was fundamental and an impairment of the ability to make the
finding. Id.
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This line of cases is particularly disturbing because a child has no right to
counsel in a dependency proceeding in Florida.
51
H. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
A. Adjudicatory Issues
The Florida courts have regularly analyzed the test for termination of
parental rights, the grounds for which are articulated in section 39.464 of the
Florida Statutes. This statute also provides that in a hearing on a petition
for termination of parental rights, the court shall consider the manifest best53
interests of the child. In Department of Children & Family Services v.
J.A., 54 a case of apparent first impression, the Department appealed on the
ground that the court failed to make a best interest finding, even after the
state failed to prove grounds to terminate under section 39.464 of the55
Florida Statutes. The appellate court recognized that terminations must be
56based upon both provisions. However, it concluded that even if the statute
required a best interest finding in every case, including those where
termination was rejected, the court's failure to do so would be harmless error
and would not affect the ultimate denial of the petition. 7
Application of the Padgett v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative
Services standard also came up recently in a termination of parental rights
case, Gaines v. Department of Children & Families.5 9 The issue was one of
"prospective" abuse or neglect. The court held that there must be a showing
in the record that the behavior of the parent was beyond the parent's control,
likely to continue, and placed the child, who was the subject of the
proceeding, at risk.60 In the case at bar, there was no showing between the
prior abuse of siblings, and the allegation of prospective abuse against the
child who was the subject of the proceeding.6'
Confidentiality is a significant issue in both dependency and
termination of parental rights cases in Florida. Section 39.471 of the Florida
51. In re D.B. & D.S., 385 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1980).
52. FLA. STAT. § 39.464 (Supp. 1998).
53. FLA. STAT. § 39.4612 (1997).
54. 701 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
55. Id. at 658-59.
56. Id. at 659.
57. Id.
58. 577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991).
59. 711 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
60. Id. at 193.
61. Id. at 194.
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Statutes governs confidentiality in termination cases and provides that all
information obtained by judges, employees of the court, authorized agents of
the Department of Children and Family Services ("DCFS"), and law
enforcement agents shall be kept confidential unless authorized by the62 63court. Stanfield v. Department of Children & Families, involved an
appeal by the adult half-sister of the children before the court in a
termination case.6 She challenged an injunctive order enjoining her from
disclosing information about the case to the media or other persons. The
appeals court held that the statutory authority to limit persons from
discussing or talking about what they learned from sources other than court
documents does not allow for an injunction. 66 "The court cannot prohibit
citizens from exercising their First Amendment right to publicly discuss
knowledge that they have gained independent of court documents even
though the information may mirror the information contained in court,,67. ..
documents. The court also indicated that it could enjoin lawyers from
discussing the proceedings.
68
B. Right to Counsel Issues
In J.B. v. Department of Children & Family Services,69 a father
appealed from a court order denying him counsel in a termination of parental
rights proceeding on the ground that he had not previously appeared and was
therefore deemed to have consented to termination of his parental rights.70
The appellate court reversed, finding that the failure to advise the father of
his right to counsel at the adjudicatory hearing, coupled with the failure to
continue the adjudicatory hearing for the purposes of allowing the father an
opportunity to obtain counsel, warranted reversal under the then applicable
provisions of chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes for appointment of counsel
71in termination cases. The failure to advise occurred after the advisory
72hearing, at which the father did not appear. The court recognized that the
case should be remanded, to allow the parent an opportunity to appear with
62. FLA. STAT. § 39.471 (Supp. 1998).
63. 698 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
64. Id. at 321.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 323.
67. Id.
68. Stanfield, 698 So. 2d at 323.
69. 703 So. 2d 1208 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
70. Id. at 1209.
71. Id. at 1210; FLA. STAT. §§ 39.465(1)(a), l(b)(3) (1997) and FLA. STAT. § 39.467(2)
(1997).
72. J.B., 703 So. 2d at 1210.
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the assistance of counsel to challenge the consent to termination of parental
rights by default, and to present evidence at the adjudicatory hearing.73
Chapter 39 was amended during the last legislative session to require
appointment of counsel to all parents in dependency cases.
74
A minor mother appealed from an order terminating her parental rights
on the ground that without counsel she signed a surrender and consent,
giving the child to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services for
subsequent adoption.75 In J.E.F.L. v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative
76Services, the mother who, after executing a voluntary surrender, was
appointed counsel, sought a continuance of the final adjudicatory hearing so
that she could attend the hearing and contest termination.77 However, she
was unable to do so because she could not find transportation.78 The trial
court denied the motion and the appeal ensued.79 The appellate court found
that this was the only opportunity to challenge the conditions under which
the minor mother executed the voluntary surrender, the grounds for which
would be fraud or duress. 80 In addition, the court held that the validity of the
waiver of counsel in order to sign the voluntary termination would also be at
issue before the court.81 The court reversed and remanded so that, with
appointed counsel the minor could show fraud or duress in the execution of
the surrender.82
C. Appellate Issues
In G.L.S. v. Department of Children & Families,83 the Supreme Court of
Florida resolved the conflict between the districts on the question of
whether, in a child dependency proceeding, an adjudication order which
terminates parental rights is immediately appealable as a final order or
reviewable only upon appeal from the disposition order.8 The first district,85 . 86
in G.L.S., held that it was, whereas the Fifth District Court of Appeal in
73. Id.
74. See infra Part IV.
75. J.E.F.L. v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 700 So. 2d 3, 4 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
76. Id. at 3.
77. Id. at 4.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. J.E.F.L, 700 So. 2d at 4..
81. Id.
82. Id. at 4-5.
83. 724 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1998).
84. Id. at 1182.
85. 700 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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Moore v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services87 and Lewis v.
Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services, held "that it is the second
or dispositional order which is the final order for purposes of appeal." 89 The
Supreme Court of Florida held "that the First District erred in holding that an
adjudication order which initially terminates parental rights in a child
dependency case may not be challenged upon appeal from a subsequent
disposition order."90
IV. STATUTORY CHANGES INVOLVING DEPENDENCY AND TERMINATION OF
PARENTAL RIGHTS
The Florida Legislature made a number of changes in 1997 that effect
dependency and termination of parental rights proceedings. Perhaps in an
effort to integrate child abuse and neglect legislation with chapter 39, the
legislature inserted many child protection provisions from chapter 415 into
chapter 39.91
The legislature made a dramatic change in the dependency field by
amending section 39.013 of the Florida Statutes, to provide that indigent
parents must be appointed counsel at the dependency stage of the
92proceedings. The change is significant in a number of respects. As a
constitutional matter, the case goes beyond the holding of the United States
Supreme Court in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services,93 in which the
high court said that there was no absolute right to counsel under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in termination of parental
rights cases.94 As a practical matter, the Florida Legislature now provides
parents with a protection that should ease the appellate docket, which in past
years contained many appeals from termination of parental rights because,
under the old law, the lack of counsel at the dependency stage rendered the
86. Id. at 99.
87. 664 So. 2d 1137 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
88. 670 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
89. Moore, 664 So. 2d at 1139.
90. G.L.S., 724 So. 2d at 1182.
91. FLA. STAT. § 39.001 (6)-(8) (Supp. 1998) (former § 415.501 (1997)); FLA. STAT. §
39.0015 (Supp. 1998) (former § 415.5015 (1997)); FLA. STAT. § 39.201 (Supp. 1998) (former
§ 415.504 (1997)); FLA. STAT § 39.203 (Supp. 1998) (former § 415.511 (1997)); FtA. STAT. §
39.204 (Supp. 1998) (former § 415.512 (1997)); FLA. STAT. § 39.205 (Supp. 1998) (former §
415.513 (1997)); FLA. STAT. § 39.303 (Supp. 1998) (former § 415.5055 (1997)); FLA. STAT. §
39.304 (Supp. 1998) (former § 415.507 (1997)); FLA. STAT. § 39.305 (Supp. 1998) (former §
415.5095 (1997)); FLA. STAT. § 39.307 (Supp. 1998) (former § 415.50171 (1997)).
92. See FLA. STAT. § 39.013(1), (8)-(10) (Supp. 1998).
93. 452 U.S. 18 (1981). See also DALE, Er AL., supra note 1 at 7 (discussing Lassiter).
94. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 25-27.
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finding of termination of parental rights invalid.95 The failure to provide free
counsel to indigent parents in dependency cases under the old law was the
subject of discussion in this survey on numerous occasions. 96 Under the new
statute, the compensation scheme of attorneys representing indigent parents
in dependency proceedings shall be established by each county. The
compensation scheme in termination of parent rights cases is a maximum of
$1,000 at the trial level and $2,500 at the appellate level.98
As a matter of case review, and in compliance with the changes in the
CAPTA, section 39.710 of the Florida Statutes was amended to provide that
when the court extends any case plan beyond twelve months, rather than
eighteen months under the prior law, judicial reviews must be held at least
every six months. 99 In the area of termination of parental rights, the
legislature also amended chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes to contain a
much more detailed procedure for the identification and location of unknown
parents after the filing of a termination of parental rights petition.10° The
diligent search requirement should help in situations where a parent
subsequently comes forward to challenge the termination of parental
rights.11
The legislature also changed the provisions governing injunctions
pending disposition of a petition in a dependency proceeding, to effectively
provide for ex pa2e injunctions where the child is reported to be in
imminent danger. Under such circumstances, notice to the parties as
provided by Rule 8.305 of the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure may be
waived. 03 However, when an immediate injunction is issued, the court shall
hold a hearing on the next day of judicial business either to dissolve the
injunction, or to continue or modify it.1°4
Section 39.501 of the Florida Statutes was amended to include a new
sub-part four which now provides that with regard to the petition for
dependency, the child's parent, guardian, or custodian must be served with a
95. See Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1997 Survey of Florida Law, 22 NovA L. REv.
179, 209-10 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 Survey].
96. Id. at 209; 1996 Survey, supra note 19, at 218; 1994 Survey, supra note 33, at 146.
97. See FLA. STAT. § 39.0134(1) (Supp. 1998).
98. See id. § 39.0134(2).
99. See also id. § 39.703(2).
100. Ch. 98-403, § 85, 1998 Fla. Laws 3081, 3201 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 39.803
(Supp. 1998)).
101. FLA. STAT. § 39.803(5)--(8) (Supp. 1998).
102. Ch. 98-403, § 65, 1998 Fla. Laws 3081, 3165-66 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
39.504(2) (Supp. 1998)).
103. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.305.
104. FLA. STAT. § 39.504(2) (Supp. 1998).
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copy of the petition at least seventy-two hours before the arraignment
hearing.
105
The Florida Legislature made a specific and provocative change in the
provisions of chapter 39, governing the activities of the guardian ad litem, at
section 39.807 of the Florida Statutes.1°6 It removed a section of that law
which previously provided that the court order a guardian ad litem to
perform other duties and undertake other responsibilities such as the court
may direct. 1°7
The legislature amended the section of the dependency statute
governing abandonment based upon imprisonment' °8 to provide that a parent
who is incarcerated in a state or federal correctional institution may be found
to have abandoned a child when "[t]he period of time for which the parent is
expected to be incarcerated will constitute a substantial portion of the period
of time before the child will attain the age of 18 years."' 9
The legislature passed a new section of chapter 39 of the Florida
Statutes dealing with protective investigations of institutional child abuse,
abandonment, or neglect.11 Section 39.302 of the Florida Statutes is a very
important addition to the statutory scheme, containing a rather detailed
investigation procedure including a notification system to the state attorney
for criminal investigation."' The law provides for restricted access of
individuals to the child if there is threatened harm to the youngster
12
The legislature also made amendments at various places in chapter 39,
to include abandonment together with abuse and neglect as dependency
grounds.! 3 Oddly, at diverse places in the statute the terms abuse and
neglect are found, but abandonment is not when the reference is to the forms
of dependency. The legislature also focused on the specific setting of the
placement of a child in an independent living arrangement when the
youngster is sixteen years of age or older.1 4 The legislature mandated
continuing court review. 15
105. FLA. STAT. § 39.501(4) (Supp. 1998).
106. FLA. STAT. § 39.807 (Supp. 1998).
107. See FLA. STAT. § 39.465(b)4. (1997) (recodified at § 39.807(b) (Supp. 1998)).
108. Ch. 98-417, § 2, 1998 Fla. Laws 3332, 3336-7 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 39.806
(Supp. 1998)).
109. FLA. STAT. § 39.806(I)(d)1 (Supp. 1998).
110. FLA. STAT. § 39.302 (Supp. 1998).
111. Id.
112. Id. at (2)(a).
113. See generally FLA. STAT. § 39.01 (Supp. 1998).
114. FLA. STAT. § 39.508(9)(a)6.e. (Supp. 1998).
115. Id.
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V. CHILDREN IN NEED OF SERVICES/FAMILIES IN NEED OF SERVICES
The Florida courts have rarely rendered opinions interpreting the
Children in Need of Services/Families in Need of Services ("CINS/FINS")
statute 6which has been in place for ten years.' 7 The statute provides for
services to children and families focused on counseling and medical,
psychiatric and psychological services.' 18 In Department of Juvenile Justice
v. C.M.,119 the question before the court was whether the trial court could
order payment by the Department of Juvenile Justice ("DJJ") to a hospital to
which the child was placed for assessment purposes.120 The court held that it
could find no case on point authorizing the court to order payment of
expenses in CINS/FINS proceedings.121 It held that DJJ showed at the trial
level that "it had no appropriated funds to pay for [the] expense[s]. 122 The
court concluded that the order interfered with both legislative discretion in
determining what funds are required of an agency and executive discretion in
spendin,_ the appropriated funds under the doctrine of separation of
powers.
VI. DELINQUENCY
A. Detention Issues
Florida's detention statute provides for both secure and nonsecure
detention and for both pre- and post-adjudication and disposition
detention.124 All determinations and court orders concerning placement into
detention are based upon a risk assessment instrument ("RA') developed by
DJJ. Application of the instrument has generated a substantial amount of
appellate law.126
116. FLA. STAT. §984.04 (1997).
117. See 1995 Survey supra note 109, at 219, 221.
118. FLA. STAT. § 984.04 (1997). For a discussion of recent changes in the CINS/FINS
statute, see 1997 Survey, supra note 95, at 205-06.
119. 704 So. 2d 1123 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
120. Id. at 1125.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See FLA. STAT. § 985.213 (Supp. 1998).
125. Id. at (2)(a), (b)1.
126. See 1997 Survey, supra note 95, at 181-83.
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N.E.W. v. Portesey,127 is a detention case evidencing the appellate
courts' ongoing need to clarify the detention law for the trial courts. In
N.E.W., the appellate court, on a motion for rehearing, affirmed its opinion
granting petitions for writs of habeas corpus for two children who were
detained as the result of a policy adopted by DJJ.'2 During the term of
community control, the children were charged with new misdemeanor level
offenses that did not involve domestic violence and which otherwise would
not allow for secure detention. 29 The court rejected the policy adopted by
DJJ and endorsed by the juvenile judges presiding over the detention
hearings in Hillsborough County finding no statutory foundation for the
approach. 3 DJJ had scored earlier third degree felony offenses on its risk
assessment instrument, which would have fulfilled the obligations of the
state statute had they been new offenses.13 1 But, the new offenses were only
132misdemeanors . Thus, the court concluded that "there [was] no statutory
authority to score a delinquent offense that has already been the subject of an
adjudicatory hearing when a juvenile is picked up for a new offense.' '133
A child may only be placed in detention after an adjudicatory hearing
when newly discovered evidence or changed circumstances are reflected on
the amended risk assessment instrument which mandates confinement. 34 In
K.K. v. Taylor,135 a child brought a writ of habeas corpus challenging her
136post-adjudication secure detention. The court held that, "the state elevates
the provision of the form to suspend the access of our citizenry to the writ of
habeas corpus, a daring proposition born more from reflexive advocacy than
reasoned legal thinking."1  The Court then added that, "[e]ven more
alarming than the state's reliance on a sentence from a form to legitimize
confinement clearly proscribed by statute is the fact that in the case at bar
the language 'must be detained' had not even been checked during the initial
preparation of the [risk assessment] form."' 38
The Florida detention statute now provides that when a child is
committed to DJJ and awaiting a dispositional placement the child must be
127. 712 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
128. Id. at 1159.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. N.E.W., 712 So. 2d at 1159.
133. Id.
134. See S.W. v. Woolsey, 673 So. 2d 152, 154 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
135. 703 So. 2d 1064 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1065.
138. Id. The court granted the writ because the statute forbid detention of the child. Id.
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removed from the detention center within five days of the commitment. 39
However, where a child is committed to a lower moderate risk residential
program, DJJ may apply for an order from the court for continued detention
for a maximum of fifteen days excluding weekends and legal holidays for
the purpose of finding an appropriate facility."4° In A. W. v. State,' and J.M.
v. State,142 the child sought a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the
court on its own motion had ordered the child to remain in secure detention
for ten 43 and fifteen' 44 days respectively, while awaiting placement. The
appeals courts held that the trial court could only extend the detention
beyond the five days pending placement in a moderate risk facility if the
Department applied to the court and demonstrated that it was necessary for145 ..
placement purposes. The extensions were not for purposes of maximizing
punishment. 146 The appellate courts reversed. 147
Another use of detention in Florida is for the placement of juveniles
who are held in direct or indirect contempt. Section 985.216(2)(a) of the
Florida Statutes provides that a juvenile may be held in a secure detention
facility for five days for a first offense or for fifteen days for a second or
subsequent offense. 14s In G.S. v. State,149 juveniles in four consolidated
cases appealed from their placement in secure detention pursuant to
contempt findings arguing that the community control statute states that
violations of community control require placement in a "consequence
unit."'I5 The consequence unit is a term introduced in the 1997 amendments
to the Florida Juvenile Code, but without definition. 151 According to the
appeals court in G.S., DJJ has not implemented the amendment.152 Nor,
according to the court, did it appear that the statute mandated the creation of
such units, and it further concluded that no funds were appropriated for the
construction of such units. 153 The court therefore held that under those
circumstances it was hesitant to say that the juvenile detention center cannot
139. Fla. Stat. § 985.215(10)(
140. Id.
141. 711 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 5th
142. 705 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 5th D
143. A.W.,711 So. 2d at 599.
144. J.M., 705 So. 2d at 99.
145. Id.; A.W.,711 So. 2d at,
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. FLA. STAT. § 985.216(2)
149. 709 So. 2d 122 (Fla. 5thI
150. See FtA. STAT. § 985.231
151. Id.
152. G.S., 709 So. 2d at 123.
153. Id.
a)l. (Supp. 1998).
Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
)ist. Ct. App. 1998).
599.
(a) (Supp. 1998).
Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
(1)(a)l.c.(I) (Supp. 1998).
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serve as a consequence unit for juveniles who violate community control or
aftercare. 54  The court concluded that "[clontempt appears to be an
alternative permissible procedure to address juvenile violators of community
,,155
control. It noted that the legislature had passed section 985.216(1) of the
Florida Statutes to obviate the Supreme Court of Florida's ruling in A.A. v.
Rolle,156 which had held that the court could not use secure detention to
punish juveniles for contempt of court.1 57 The court concluded in G.S. that
the contempt procedure is a free standing separate provision of the law,
distinct from the violation procedures and remedies under community
control. 58 Thus, while the juveniles in the case at bar had not been charged
with violating community control, they were held to have been in contempt
of court. 59 The appeals court thus affirmed the placement in securedetention.16 °
B. Adjudicatory Issues
Florida's speedy trial rule in juvenile cases provides that the case must
be brought to trial within ninety days.161 The Third District Court of Appeal
recently held so in State v. Meza,16 a case in which the trial court discharged
a juvenile when the information was filed on the ninetieth day because, in its
view, ninety days means ninety days. 63 Relying on an earlier Supreme
Court of Florida opinion in P.S. v. State,164 the court held that the state may
not file or re-file charges after the ninetieth day of the juvenile speedy trial
period but may file on the ninetieth day. 65 66
A second case dealing with the speedy trial rule is P.G. v. State. After
the expiration of the ninety day speed' trial period the state nolle prossed a
charge of battery against a juvenile. Subsequently, the state filed a new
petition charging the child with resisting an officer without violence. 68 The
154. Id.
155. Id. at 123-24.
156. 604 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1992).
157. Id. at 818-19.
158. G.S., 709 So. 2d at 124.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.090(a).
162. 697 So. 2d 968 (Fa. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
163. Id. at 968.
164. 658 So. 2d 92,94 (Fla. 1995).
165. Id.
166. 711 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
167. Id. at 189.
168. Id.
834 [Vol. 23:819
16
Nova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 3 [1999], Art. 3
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol23/iss3/3
1999]
defense attorney filed a motion for discharge under the speedy trial rule
which was denied and the child pleaded with the reservation of a right to
appeal. 169 Under Rule 8.090 of the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure,
every child charged with a delinquent act shall be brought to an adjudicatory
hearing without demand within ninety days of the earlier of the date the child
was taken into custody or the date the petition was filed. 17 The district court
of appeals held that the time limitations contained in the rule cannot be
avoided by the filing of a nolle prosequi by the prosecutor.171 In the case at
bar, the state entered the nolle prosequi after the ninety day period had run
and there being no requirement that the failure to request a discharge by the
child after the initial ninety days had run constitutes a waiver, the
government could not reinstitute delinquency proceedings.172
Florida has an expansive statute dealing with the transfer of juveniles to
adult court which provides for both direct filing and transfer from the
juvenile court. 17 In State v. Davis,174 over the state's objections, the trial
court in the juvenile division conducted a bond hearing for a custody release
after the state had advised the court that the matter was set for arraignment
before a judge in the adult felony division.175 The appeals court held that the
lower court departed from its statutory obligation to immediately order that
the juvenile be transported to the adult county jail upon the state's
announcement that the charges had been direct filed in the adult division
where the child would subseuently be booked, processed, and released in
the normal course as an adult.
r 6
In an important decision, the Supreme Court of Florida recently upheld
as constitutional the Florida statutory rape statute 177 as it applied to two
fifteen-year-old boys who engaged in consensual sex with two twelve-year-
old girls in J.A.S. v. State. The court had previously dealt with the
question in the context of adults charged with consensual sexual intercourse
with persons under the age of sixteen in B.B. v. State179 and Jones v. State. 80
In J.A.S., the court upheld the constitutionality of the statute in a consensual
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. P.G., 711 So. 2d at 189 (citing State v. T.W., 679 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1996)).
172. Id. at 189-90.
173. See generally FLA. STAT. § 985 (1997).
174. 699 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
175. Id. at 848.
176. Id. See FLA STAT. § 985.215(4)(a) (Supp. 1998).
177. FLA. STAT. § 800.04 (1997).
178. 705 So. 2d 1381 (Fla. 1998).
179. 659 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1995).
180. 640 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 1994).
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setting finding that the state had a compelling interest in intervening to stop
sexual misconduct even when consensual. The court also refused to
extend the minor's privacy rights which had been established in the abortion
context in In re T.W.182 In B.B., the court had found section 794.05 of the
Florida Statutes unconstitutional as applied to the facts of that case,
specifically as both the charged defendant and the alleged consenting victim
were age sixteen.183 The question there was whether the statute which
applied to two juveniles in the context of claims of juvenile delinquency
involved intimate acts which fell within the zone of privacy recognized by
both the United States Constitution and the Florida Constitution under theS184
T. W. holding. The court held that it did, specifically distinguishing the
185
adult/minor situation from the minor/minor situation. However, in J.A.S.,
the court recognized what it viewed as the fundamental distinction that the
defendants were two fifteen-year-old boys and the two victims were two
twelve-year-old jirls, as opposed to all of the youngsters being sixteen-year-
olds as in B.B. 1 6 The court concluded in J.A.S. that on a balancing of
interests, the state's compelling interest in protecting children from harmful
sexual conduct outweighed the right of privacy of the defendants. 187 The
state had a compelling interest in protecting twelve-year-olds from older
teenagers and from their own immaturity in engaging in harmful conduct.1
88
The appellate courts have been faced on a number of occasions with
appeals from adjudications of delinquency for disorderly conduct based
upon findings that the child used loud, obscene, and/or verbal protests. In
K.S. v. State,189 a juvenile appealed from an adjudication based upon a
finding that the child cursed at a police officer for what he felt was an
unjustified accusation. 19° Relying on a long line of cases, the court reversed,
holding that the child's words did not inflict injury or constitute intent to
incite an immediate breach of the peace.i9' On the other hand, in K.A.C. v.
State,192 the court upheld the adjudication for resisting an officer without
181. J.A.S., 705 So. 2d at 1383.
182. Id.; 551 So. 2d 1186 (FIa. 1989).
183. B.B., 659 So. 2d at 260. See also 1995 Survey supra note 109, at 197-98.
184. Id. at 258.
185. Id. at 259.
186. J.A.S., 705 So. 2d at 1383-85.
187. Id. at 1386.
188. Id.
189. 697 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
190. Id. at 1276.
191. Id. See also H.K. v. State, 711 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998); L.A.T. v.
State, 650 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Livingston v. State, 610 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
192. 707 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
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violence because the essence of the offense was the refusal to respond to
questions that officers had a right to ask as opposed to, as in prior cases, a
charge based upon what the youth said in the form of loud profanity directed
at the police.
193 "
The appeals courts have made clear that when multiple offenses
constitute the basis for a delinquency adjudication, separate disposition
orders for each offense must be used. Nonetheless, the trial courts
continually fail to comply with this provision. For example, in DA.D. v.
State,194 the state filed three separate petitions for delinquency against the
child. 195 The court used a single commitment order for all three offenses in
clear violation of prior case law.
196
Section 874.03(3) of the Florida Statutes provides that in a course of
the commission or solicitation of two or more felonies or violent
misdemeanors on separate occasions within a three-year period an individual• •197 198
can be declared a member of a criminal street gang. In S.L. v. State, a
juvenile appealed from the declaration that he was a member of criminal
street gang.199 The appeals court reversed finding that there was no
demonstration of a pattern of criminal street gang activity necessary to make
the law applicable. 2°° The court held that gang membership alone is
insufficient to declare a person a member of a criminal street gang.21 Here,
only the gang membership was proven. The officers testified that the
juvenile admitted to being a member of the "Latin Lords" and when he was
arrested had "Latin Lords" graffiti in his book bag.202 But there was no
showing that the Latin Lords committed, or attempted to commit two or
more felonies or violent misdemeanors. 203
The issue of proper application of Miranda warnings in the context of
juveniles comes up regularlyn Florida appellate case law. This year was no
different. In State v. R.M., the state appealed from an order suppressing
193. Id. at 1177 (citing L.A.T. v. State, 650 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995);
Livingston v. State, 610 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992)).
194. 697 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
195. Id.
196. Id. (citing D.D.M. v. State, 662 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 5th Dist. CL App. 1995); T.A.R. v.
State, 640 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994)); see also A.V.B. v. State, 715 So. 2d 954
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
197. FLA. STAT. § 874.03(3) (Supp. 1998).
198. 708 So. 2d 1006 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
199. Id. at 1007.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1008.
202. Id. at 1007.
203. S.L, 708 So. 2d at 1008.
204. 696 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1997).
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evidence and the appeals court affirmed, applying the Florida rules that the
confession must be shown to be voluntary, °5 and the burden is on the state
to establish voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence 2°6 based upon
the totality of the circumstances. In the R.M. case, the court upheld the
suppression in light of the facts of the case which were described as a
fourteen-year-old who had been in a home with a younger sister when the
detective arrested her for strong arm robbery.208 The child was handcuffed,
placed in a squad car, and taken to the police station to a brightly lit
interrogation room where the detective said it would be in the child's best
interests to give a statement because he would go to court and tell the judge
that she had been cooperative. The child's mother was not called and the
detective did not tell the child that she could have her mother present. The
youngster said she talked to the officer because her mother had told her in
the past that it was proper to cooperate with people and to be polite to
adults. 209
In juvenile delinquency proceedings certain discovery is permitted
under the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure.21° The issue before the Third
District Court of Appeal in State v. D.R. was whether the respondent child,
through counsel, could issue a subpoena duces tecum.212 The State filed a
motion for a protective order to quash on the ground that subpoenas duces
213tecum are not permitted without leave of the court. The appeals court held
that the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure governing discovery
depositions in criminal matters do not allow such subpoenas without
permission of the court and that the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure
governing depositions are identical to the criminal rule.2 14 Because the
Supreme Court of Florida approved the construction of the criminal rule, the
same construction should apply in juvenile court.215
A recent enactment dealing with youth crime was the passage in 1994
by Dade County of a Comprehensive Anti-Graffiti Ordinance which made it
216illegal to sell spray paint cans and broad tipped markers to minors. A
205. Id. at 451; see Coffee v. State, 6 So. 493, 496 (1889).
206. State v. Kettering, 483 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
207. See Frazier v. State, 107 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1958).
208. R.M., 696 So. 2d at 451.
209. Id.
210. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.060.
211. 701 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
212. Id. at 121.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See Heath v. Becktell, 327 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1976) (construing FIA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220
(1976)).
216. DADE COUNTY CODE § 21-30.01 (1994).
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minor challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance, which makes it a
misdemeanor to have broad-tipped markers or spray paint with the intent to
draw graffitti, in D.P. v. State.217 The Third District Court of Appeals
upheld the constitutionality of the anti-graffiti ordinance because it did not
place an outright ban on the possession of spray paint or jumbo markers by
minors and thus did not violate the juvenile's due process or equal
protection rights. 1 Judge Green dissented, finding the ordinance facially
unconstitutional as violative of the due process clauses of both the state and
federal Constitution. 9
C. Dispositional Issues
An important form of disposition in Florida delinquency cases is
restitution. Trial courts have had difficul applying the principles of
restitution in such cases.220 In D.J.R. v. State, 1 a juvenile was charged with
attempted burglary and pleaded to the lessor crime of petit theft.22
Specifically, he pleaded to cutting an alarm wire at a commercial business. 223
The wire was subsequently repaired and yet six hours later an unrelated
burglary and theft occurred at the same business. 4 At that time, the alarm
was functioning properly and was triggered .2m Incredibly, the trial court
imposed restitution for items stolen in the burglary the following morning at
the same location.226 The appellate court held that the state may not require
the child to pay restitution for damages that were not caused by or related to
the child's criminal episode and were not included in the child's plea.
227
The Florida statutory provisions concerning restitution provide that the
amount of restitution may not exceed an amount the child and the parent or
guardian may reasonably pay.22M However, the court has flexibility in
fashioning the restitution requirements. In M.H. v. State,229 the court entered
217. 705 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
218. Id. at 596-97.
219. Id. at 598 (Green, J., dissenting).
220. See 1997 Survey, supra note 95, at 199-201; 1995 Survey, supra note 109, at 199-
200.
221. 701 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. D.J.R., 701 So. 2d at 383.
227. Id. at 384 (citing FLA. STAT. § 775.089(1)(b)2 (1995)).
228. FLA. STAT. § 985.231(1)(a)l.d.6. (Supp. 1998).
229. 698 So. 2d 395 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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230a restitution order liquidating the restitution. As to actual payment, the
court held that the child would begin to pay no later than thirty days
following either her sixteenth birthday or gaining employment, whichever
came first 231 The court of appeals approved this determination finding that
a flexible statutory scheme encourages restitution both to compensate
victims and to serve the rehabilitative and deterrent rules of the juvenile
justice system. The court added that a reasonable reading of the statute
allows the court to revisit the payment schedule issue as the child ages and
life skills and earning capacity crystallize.233
Restitution orders must also be made in timely fashion. The Supreme
Court of Florida has said that restitution may be ordered within sixty days of
sentencing although the determination and amount to be paid may be made
23423beyond the sixty day period. In LO. v. State,235 the court ordered a child
to pay $1,060 in restitution for injuries resulting when the respondent hit a
fellow student breaking the student's tooth. 236 While the trial court did not
enter a written order of restitution at the time of sentencing or within sixty
days thereafter, the appeals court concluded that the trial court put the child
and counsel on notice that the juvenile would be responsible for restitution
as the trial court made a timely reservation of jurisdiction to award
restitution in its oral pronouncement and then some months later set the
exact amount to be paid.237 The court rejected several First District Court of
Appeal cases which held that an oral reservation of jurisdiction would be
insufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Supreme Court of Florida case
law.23
8
An important dispositional issue recently came before the Supreme
Court of Florida in P.W.G. v. State.239 The issue was whether the trial court
in a delinquency case can order placement in a particular facility based upon
criminal conduct for which the child had not been charged. 2F4 The childclaimed that such a basis for disposition violated his right to substantive due
230. Id. at 396.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 397.
234. State v. Sanderson, 625 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 1993).
235. 697 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1275.
238. See T.W.L. v. State, 684 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Campbell v. State,
614 So. 2d. 600 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993); King v. State, 611 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1992).
239. 702 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 1997).
240. Id. at 490.
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process of law under both the state and federal constitutions. 241 There had
been substantial evidence in the predisposition report of the child's unproven
prior sexual abuse and sexual battery of relatives.242 The pre-disposition
report concluded, in light of the child's history, that he could benefit from a
treatment program focused upon sexual offenders.243  But, because such
treatment is only available in programs classified as high risk restrictiveness
level, the recommendation was that he be committed to the Department at
such a level.244 In light of the distinction between the goal of the juvenile
delinquency system and the adult criminal justice system-rehabilitation in
the case of the former toward the end of preventing delinquent children from
becoming adult offenders-it was constitutionally permissible for the trial
court to impose whatever treatment plan it concluded was most likely to be
effective for the particular child.245 This comported with the court's parens
patriae approach.
Under Florida law, when an alleged juvenile delinquent has been
determined to be incompetent, the trial court may order commitment of the
child accused of delinquent acts to DCF, but only where the alleged act
constitutes a felony.247 Significantly, as the court held in Department of
Children & Family Services v. A.A.S.T.M., 4 the DCF may not receive a
child determined to be incompetent where the charge is merely a
misdemeanor.249 The court said nothing about what happens to a child under
these circumstances.
The Florida disposition statute in delinquency cases provides for a
variet of legislatively authorized dispositional alternatives. In C.M. v.
State, a child entered a plea of guilty to the charge of aggravated fleeing or
attempting to elude a law enforcement officer but objected to a condition of
community control requiring him to write a letter of apology to the driver of
the car he was following and to have no contact with his or her property.
2
The appeals court held that, under the facts of the case, the disposition met
the appropriate standard of being reasonably related to the offense, to
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. P.W.G., 702 So. 2d at 490.
245. Id. at 491.
246. Id.
247. FLA. STAT. § 985.223 (Supp. 1998).
248. 706 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
249. Id. at 367.
250. FLA. STAT. § 985.231 (1997).
251. 696 So. 2d 1350 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
252. Id. at 1350.
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rehabilitation of the child, or protection of the public, and was therefore, a
valid condition of probation or community control.5 3
Under Florida law it has been held that conduct which is offensive to
the court and which shows a lack of contrition or remorse is not sufficient to
overcome the burden placed upon a trial court when it disregards placement
recommendations by DJJ. In R.D.S. v. State,55 the court elected to
disregard the minimum risk placement recommendation of DJJ.2 5 6 The court
found the child's body language disrespectful and contemptuous.25 7 The
appeals court held that in order to disregard such a recommendation the
court's reasons must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence;
therefore, it reversed. 8
As a general proposition, in Florida, the disposition in a juvenile court
proceeding can be no longer than the sentence of an adult convicted of a
crime.25 9 In M.G. v. State,2w the court adjudicated a child to have committed
the offense of battery and ordered her to serve an unspecified period of
community control as a sanction. 261 The appeals court held that because the
trial court adjudicated her delinquent, an independent period of community
control was improper. 262 The disposition imposed must be limited to the
amount of time for which an adult could be sentenced for the same crime.
2 63
It is only when a juvenile has had the adjudication withheld that an
indeterminate period of community control is a proper disposition.2
4
The Florida statute contains five restrictiveness levels of placement as
to which the DJJ makes recommendations. 265 The First and Second District
Courts of Appeal differ as to whether the court must seek an additional
recommendation from DJJ after rejecting a recommendation of a particular
restrictiveness level. The First District takes the position that a
recommendation of community control is not a "restrictiveness level" so that
the court's decision not to follow a recommendation requires a re-
253. Id. at 1351.
254. See generally R.D.S. v. State, 696 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
255. 696 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
256. Id. at 1189.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. See M.B. v. State, 693 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
260. 696 So. 2d 1340 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
261. Id. at 1341.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. FLA. STAT. § 985.03(46) (Supp. 1998).
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submission to the Department for a recommended restrictiveness level.266
The Second District takes the view that a recommendation of community
control is a restriction and thus, no further submission to the Department is
required when the trial court decides to depart from the recommended
sanction.' In H.H. v. State, 8 the Fifth District Court of Appeal referenced
the opinions from the two other districts but found, under the facts of the
case, that the Department had recommended a particular restrictiveness
level, and the court departed from the prior holdings of the first and second
districts.269 Thus, where community control played no part in the trial court
opinion, the departure was appropriate.270 Finally, in L.R.J. v. State,27' the
First District Court of Appeal certified the question of whether alternative
recommendations are necessary as follows:
DOES THE TRIAL JUDGE, ACTING AFTER A DISPOSITION
HEARING AND BASED ON SPECIFIC REASONS, HAVE
AUTHORITY TO REJECT THE DEPARTMENT'S
COMMUNITY CONTROL RECOMMENDATION WITHOUT
REMANDING THE CASE TO THE DEPARTMENT FOR AN
ALTERNATIVE RECOMMENDATION?272
The appellate courts continue to admonish the trial courts on appeals
relating to the trial courts' commitments of delinquent children to restrictive
levels greater than those recommended by the DJJ because the court believed
the children had lied at trial. In D.A.J. v. State,273 the appellate court
reversed, explaining once again that such action by the court would
impermissibly chill the exercise of Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights of the
child at trial.274
266. See T.M. v. State, 701 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997); C.A.J. v. State, 706
So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
267. See D.L.B. v. State, 707 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998), aff'd, 720 So.
2d 202 (Fla. 1998).
268. 712 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
269. Id. at 1203-04.
270. Id. at 1204.
271. 706 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998), rev'd, 720 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1998). See
also P.A. v. State, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D429 (lst Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 1998), rev'd, 720 So. 2d
210 (Fla. 1998); E.D.P. v. State, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D348 (1st Dist. CL App. Jan. 27, 1998),
rev'd, 724 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 1998).
272. LR.J., 706 So. 2d at 73.
273. 699 So. 2d 812 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
274. Id. at 813.
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The Florida statute governing juvenile proceedings contains an
extensive provision governing contempt and contempt sanctions.275 In
276N.M.R. v. State, a juvenile appealed from a contempt citation for failure to
complete court-ordered sanctions and community control that resulted in a
sentence of ninety days in jail for indirect criminal contempt.277  The
appellate court held that the contempt statute does not provide for jail as an
alternative sanction. 278 Because the appellant was under the jurisdiction of
the juvenile court, the appellate court held that the trial court erred by
sentencing her as an adult for violation of a court-imposed order while she
was under the age of eighteen. 9
D. Appellate Issues
The Supreme Court of Florida recently cleared up a question of
appellate procedure that had been troubling the intermediate appellate
280 281courts. The question in State v. T.M.B. was whether sections
924.051(3)-(4) of the Florida Statutes, which describe the procedure for
preserving appeals in criminal cases, applies to juvenile delinquency
cases.282 The court held that the sections did not apply because the juvenile
system is different from the adult system, focusing on rehabilitation rather
than punishment.2 3 In addition, the terms and conditions of juvenile appeals
are addressed exhaustively in chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes and the
legislature intended chapter 39 to govern delinquency proceedings.5
E. Statutory Changes
The legislature made a number of modest changes relating to
delinquency matters during the 1998 session. It amended section 985.231 of
275. See FLA. STAT. § 985.216 (Supp. 1998); see also discussion supra at p. 14-15.
276. 711 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
277. Id. at 145-46.
278. Id. at 148.
279. Id.
280. See J.D.B. v. State, 720 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998), rev'd, 720 So. 2d
211 (Fla. 1998); T.M.B. v. State, 689 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 1st Dist. CL App. 1997), aft'd, 716 So.
2d 269 (Fla. 1998); R.A.M. v. State, 695 So. 2d 1308 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997), affd, 716
So. 2d 769 (Fla. 1998).
281. 716 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1998).
282. Id. at 269.
283. Id. at 270-71.
284. Id. See also State v. A.L.W., 717 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1998); State v. B.D.W., 717 So.
2d 460 (Fla. 1998). In 1997, the legislature moved the delinquency provisions from chapter 39 to
chapter 985. See Dale, supra note 96, at 202-205.
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the Florida Statutes to provide that the trial court may order a juvenile to
undergo random substance abuse testing during the dispositional phase of a• 285
delinquency case upon recommendation of DJJ. Testing may also occur
after the disposition in the case of a petition alleging a violation of
community control or aftercare.28 6 The legislature also amended section
985.309 of the Florida Statutes to continue providing local funds to operate
boot camps that are to be operated under the supervisory authority of sheriffs
under contract with the DJJ.2 7 The continued funding is interesting in light
of the fact that there is a growing bog of national literature questioning the
rehabilitative benefits of boot camps. 
8
A separate change in dispositional alternatives is the provision for court
jurisdiction to place a child who violates community control or aftercare into
a residential consequence unit which is a secure location used for children
violating community control or aftercare or for youth determined by the
court to have violated conditions of community control or aftercare if there
is a consequence unit available.289 The legislature changed the title of intake
counselors and case managers to juvenile probation officers with the result
that the terminology now matches that found throughout the country. 290 The
legislature also took a first step toward dealing with juvenile sexual
offenders by establishing a task force to make recommendations for
standards relating to licensed professionals who work with juvenile
offenders and victims.291 The legislature further authorized a local child
protection team or state attorney to establish a sexual abuse intervention
network, in order to collaborate on programs for juvenile offenders and
victims and to obtain funds from the Office of the Attorney General or other
funding sources. 292 The law now requires DCF and DJJ to disclose to school
superintendents the presence of a juvenile with a known history of predatory
sexual behavior who is an adjudicated juvenile sexual offender. Finally,
the legislature passed a bill authorizing the Juvenile Justice Advisory Board
285. Ch. 98-55, § 1, 1998 Fla. Laws 361, 362 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 985.231(1)(a)1
(Supp. 1998)).
286. FLA. STAT. § 985.231(1)(a)1 (Supp. 1998).
287. See generally Ch. 98-282, 1998 Fla. Laws 2495-99 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 985.
309 (Supp. 1998)).
288. See generally Boot Camps for Juvenile Offenders, OFFICE OF JUVENLE JUSTICE &
DEIjNQUENCY PREVENTION (U.S. Dep't of Justice, Washington, D.C.) Sept. 1997, at 32-33.
289. FLA. STAT. § 985.231(1)(a)lc (Supp. 1998).
290. FLA. STAT. § 985.03(32) (Supp. 1998).
291. FtA. STAT. § 985.403 (Supp. 1998).
292. Id.
293. See FLA STAT. § 39.411 (Supp. 1998); FLA. STAT. § 490.012 (Supp. 1998); FA.
STAT. § 490.0145 (Supp. 1998); FLA. STAT. § 985.308 (Supp. 1998); FLA. STAT. § 985.04 (Supp.
1998).
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to conduct a study on a number of educational matters in the juvenile justice
system.294
VII. CONCLUSION
The Florida appellate courts continue a long tradition of admonitions to
the trial courts to comply with the statutory mandates of chapters 39 and
985. At the same time, the appellate courts continue the laudable process of
statutory interpretation. The Supreme Court of Florida has handed down
several important cases including its most recent interpretation of statutory
295
rape.
Finally, the legislature, while not active in the delinquency field to the
extent it has been in prior years, did make a number of significant changes to• 296
the dependency and termination of parental rights statute. The most
significant was the expansion of the right to counsel for indigent parents in
dependency proceedings, a long overdue change.
297
294. See generally FLA. STAT. § 230.23 (Supp. 1998).
295. See J.A.S. v. State, 705 So. 2d 1381 (Fla. 1998).
296. See, e.g., 1998 Fla. Laws 98-403; 1998 Fla. Laws 98-417.
297. FLA. STAT. § 39.013 (Supp. 1998).
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